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Contract versus Property Remedies 
Omri Ben-Shahar† 
This Article investigates the distinction between the remedies for breach of contract 
and for violation of property rights. It identifies a class of situation in which both types of 
remedies may be available to an aggrieved party. Using economic analysis, it argues that 
in these situations the unclear boundaries between contract and property remedies can 
create distortions in measuring recovery and in the incentive of wrongdoers. This distor-
tion is aggravated by an additional option to measure damages based on ex-post realiza-
tion versus ex ante expected value. 
 INTRODUCTION 
This Article examines the interface between two types of damage 
remedies: for breach of contract and for violation of a property right. 
For example, an employee may cause harm to the employer’s property, 
and this may constitute a breach of the employment contract but also a 
violation of the employer’s physical property rights. Or, a licensee may 
make an unlicensed use of intellectual property rights, and this may 
constituted a breach the license contract and also an infringement upon 
the property rights of the licensor. Or, a seller may use the goods he 
already sold, but did not yet deliver, to the buyer, and this may be a 
breach of contract and also a violation of the buyer’s acquired property 
rights. 
 
In each one of these setting, the property owner has a contractual 
relation with the offender, and thus a fundamental question arises – 
which remedy applies? Is the aggrieved property owner entitled to the 
remedies that protect property rights? Or is he entitled to the remedies 
that protect the contractual relations he happens to have with the of-
fender? Or, perhaps yet, is he entitled to both, or to a choice between 
the two arsenals of remedial claims?  
 
                                                                                                                                             
 † Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, The University of 
Chicago Law School. Mike Morrill provided valuable research assistance. 
 This article builds on and extends two previous articles, Ben-Shahar 
& Mikos (2005) and Ben-Shahar (2011). 
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This distinction between breach of contract and violation of prop-
erty has important implications for measuring damages. Damages for 
breach of contract are based on a principle that is unique to contract 
law – the protection of the expectation interest of the aggrieved party. 
He is entitled to money damages that will provide him the benefit he 
expected to get from the contract, but not necessarily the value of the 
damaged property. In contrast, damages for violation of property rights 
are based on two different principles that are fundamental to property 
but not to contract law – harm and restitution. The offender has to pay 
for the harm to the damaged property, irrespective of the contractual 
expectations. And if the offender benefitted from the violation, this 
benefit can be disgorged and “returned” to the property owner.  
 
Consider the following example: A copyright owner licenses the 
right to publish his novel in a specific medium, say, in paperback, to a 
licensee. The licensee commits one of three wrongful acts: (1) he 
launches the distribution belatedly, thereby reducing the owner’s prof-
its; (2) he distributes the work in additional media that were not cov-
ered by the license, and reaps much profits; (3) he makes changes to 
the text of the work, cutting chapters and revising the story’s ending, to 
make the book more “marketable.” In each of these cases, did he com-
mit a breach of contract? Or did he infringe upon the owner’s copy-
right? Are damages limited to the owner’s lost profits, which might of-
ten be low or hard to prove, or could the damages instead be measured 
by the violator’s profits, which are higher and easier to prove? 
 
In the first part of this Article, I demonstrate that despite the clear 
conceptual abstract distinction between contract and property damag-
es, the law has hard time determining which remedy is available when. 
The problem arises because the same behavior—the same offense—
can be classified both as breach of contract and a violation of property. I 
survey some of the rules that American law uses to divide the work 
between contact and property law, and note a patterns of arbitrary and 
confused distinctions.  
 
In the second part of the Article, I demonstrate another dichotomy 
that compounds the problem of damage assessment: the timing of 
measurement. Each damage measure—contract or property—can be 
measure either ex post or ex ante. An ex post measure focus on the ex-
pected value of the compensated interest as known at the time of the 
violation, whereas the ex post measure provides added accuracy by 
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setting the damages equal to the actual value as known at the time of 
trial.  
 
The third part of the Article uses economic analysis to evaluate the 
effects of these fuzzy boundaries between contract and property dam-
ages, and between ex post and ex ante damages. One of the most sur-
prising effects is the ability of a litigant to choose which remedy (con-
tract versus property and which measurement methodology (ex post 
versus ex ante) apply. If it is the plaintiff (the aggrieved party) who 
chooses, he is effectively entitled to the greater of the two remedies. 
When the two measure of recovery differ, these options to choose the 
greater-of or the lesser-of can be quite valuable. I will also show that 
these options also create distorted incentives in property and contrac-
tual relations. 
 
Let me briefly illustrate the insights of this paper through the sim-
ple example of a violation of a copyright license. Imagine that the licen-
see violated the license terms and distributed the materials owned by 
the licensor through a medium that was not licensed. The violation had 
the potential of both harming the owner and benefiting the violator, but 
the magnitude of either effect was unknown at the time of violation. 
Assume that the harm to the owner, measured by the lost profits, was 
$1000. Assume, also, that at the time the violation, the benefit to the 
violator from the unlicensed use, measured by the extra profits he 
made, was uncertain, either $2000 or $0, each with equal probabilities. 
(This uncertainty, too, would be resolved by the time the suit would 
reach court, and evidence can be assembled regarding the actual profit 
garnered by the violation). The expected benefit was, accordingly, 
$1000. Notice that in this example, the expected profit equaled the ex-
pected harm—the violation was neither efficient nor inefficient, ex 
ante.  
 
How would the law remedy this violation? If the remedy were 
measured by the contractual rule of expectation damages, it would 
equal $1000. If instead, the remedy were measure by the property rule 
of restitution, it would equal the actual benefit that the viola-
tor/licensee reaped. If this value turns out to be high—in our example, 
$2000—the property owner would choose it over the contractual 
measure of $1000 and recover the full $2000. If, instead, the benefit 
turns out to be low—$0—the property owner would choose the con-
tractual measure instead, and recover$1000. In all, the property owner 
would recover either $2000 or $1000, each with equal likelihood, for an 
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expected recovery of $1500. This expected recovery exceeds either the 
expected loss to the owner or the expected gain to the violator, because 
it is equal to the greater of the two. In effect, the entitlement is worth 
more the owner when violated!  
 
  How could this be? I will show in the paper that the crucial ele-
ment in making this distorted measure of recovery happen is the choice 
that a party has among competing measures of damages. This choice 
embeds an option into the recovery rule, and bolsters it by the value of 
the option.  
 
The question remains, though, how and why the law accords a par-
ty the choice between two different measures of damages. I will show 
how such regimes of multi-measures evolve, how they might be justi-
fied, and why these justifications ultimately fail. 
 
Finally, I will end by listing some principles that can help shape a 
rational policy of the election of remedies. In which situations should a 
pure property measure apply, and in which should a pure contract 
measure apply? How should we classify an offense—a property viola-
tion or a contract breach?  Economic analysis suggests that the choice 
between property violation and contract breach—as well as the associ-
ate remedies—cannot be conducted along conceptual or mechanical 
tests.  The choice has to respond to the basic question: when are con-
tract damages insufficient to protect entitlements, and should be en-
hanced by the greater property protection.  
 
I.  PROPERTY AND CONTRACT REMEDIES 
 
A. Conversion of Property by Seller 
 
The first example of the tense line between breach of contract and 
violation of property involves the protection of the rights of buyers in 
the period between the date of the purchase and the final conveyance 
of the property to the buyer. In this interim stage, the buyer does not 
yet have a perfected property right, although some seeds of property 
entitlement, beyond the contractual right, already emerge.  It is often 
said that the seller continues to hold the legal title to the property “sub-
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ject to an equitable obligation to convey” it to the purchaser.1 In various 
cases of real property purchase, for example, it was held that “the rights 
of the purchaser are contract rights rather than rights of ownership of 
real property.”2 
 
There are many ways in which the seller can breach the sale con-
tract, for example by failing to deliver in time or by damaging the pur-
chased goods. These breaches rarely implicate any property-remedy, 
and are addressed by damages for breach of contract, such as the dif-
ference between the actual value and the promised value of the goods. 
But one type of violation raises the remedial dichotomy and the con-
tract/property interface: The seller’s deliberate expropriation of value 
from the asset prior to its delivery, in a way that both benefits the seller 
and harms the buyer. 
 
Consider, for example, the case of Laurin v. DeCarolis Construc-
tion.3 A buyer entered a contract to purchase a wooded parcel of real 
estate. Under the terms of the contract, the deed was to be delivered six 
months after the execution of the contract. During these six months, 
while he still held the property, the seller removed the majority of the 
trees from the lot and 360 truckloads of gravel, and sold those for a nice 
profit in the open market. These actions were ruled to be a breach of 
contract, but the question the court had to address was the measure-
ment of damages. Is the buyer entitled to the contract damages, here 
equal to the diminution of the property value? Or is the buyer entitled 
to the substantially higher property remedy of disgorgement damages, 
here equal to the benefit to the seller from the expropriation? 
 
This generic question is difficult for courts to resolve. In the Laurin 
case, the lower court ruled that the buyer was the “equitable owner” of 
the property and thus the conduct was a violation of property—the tort 
of conversion—and awarded the buyer the higher measure of damages 
equal to the value of the benefit to the seller. The court of appeals took 
a different view: “as the plaintiffs were not in or entitled to possession 
of the premises during the period when the gravel was removed there-
                                                                                                                                             
1 Barrell v. Britton, 244 Mass. 273, 278-279, 138 N.E. 579, 582 (1923); 
Kares v. Covell, 180 Mass. 206, 209, 62 N.E. 244 (1902).  
2 Laurin v. DeCarolis Construction,  72 Mass. 688, 363 N.E. 2d 675 
(1977). 
3 72 Mass. 688, 363 N.E. 2d 675 (1977). 
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from by the defendant, they are not entitled to the value of the gravel 
removed on the theory of conversion which was employed by the mas-
ter in determining damages.  . . . The plaintiffs are entitled  . . . to the 
diminution in the value of the land which was caused by the defend-
ant's stripping and appropriation . . .”4 The case then reached the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Court , which took yet another view: the buyer was 
not an equitable owner, therefore the conduct was merely a breach of 
contract, but nevertheless, due to the willful nature of the breach, the 
buyer was entitled to disgorgement measure of damages—the value 
appropriated from the land.5 
Pragmatically, my reading of American common law suggests that 
in cases like this—situations of deliberate breach of contract that rises 
to the level of property violation—plaintiffs can choose the greater of 
the two remedies, diminution-in-value of purchased asset versus the 
value to the violator of the appropriated goods. The New York Court of 
Appeals made this option explicit.6  The court recognized that there are 
two possible scenarios. In the first scenario, the value of the material 
removed from the land is low in comparison to the loss of value to the 
land. In this scenario, the aggrieved buyer can recover the contract 
remedy of diminution-in-value.7 As another court explained, “there was 
substantial testimony that the lands the [plaintiffs] purchased were 
worth $5000.00 less because of the [timber removed] by the [defend-
ants]. Just because the [defendants] sold the timber for a small amount 
of money does not necessarily determine the measure of damages.”8  In 
the second scenario, the value of the materials removed from the land 
is high in comparison to the loss of value to the land, and in this case 
the aggrieved buyer can recover the disgorgement remedy.9 As ex-
                                                                                                                                             
4 Id. at 677. 
5 Id., at 678-79. 
6 See Worrall v Munn, 53 NY 185, 189–190 (NY 1873) 
7 See id at 190 (“If the soil, having no value separated from the land, 
was stripped from [land], so as to render it unproductive and unfit for 
the use to which it was applied, the diminished value of the land would 
be the only adequate measure of compensation. So, also, where trees 
designed for shade or ornament have been cut down, whereby the 
value of the land has been greatly lessened.”) 
8 Walker v Dibble, 241 Ark 692, 696 (Ark 1966). 
9 See id. (“Cutting a few trees on a timber tract, or taking a few hundred 
tons of coal from a mine, might not diminish the market value of the 
tract, or of the mine, and yet the value of the wood or coal, severed from 
the soil, might be considerable. The wrong-doer would, in the cases 
instanced, be held to pay the value of the wood and coal, and he could 
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plained by the Massachusetts court, the disgorgement of profit remedy 
is available because the violation “merely deprives the defendant of a 
profit wrongfully made, a profit which the plaintiff was entitled to 
make.”10   
 
Courts across the United States disagree whether such violations 
constitute property infringement, contract breach, or both. But, inter-
estingly, when it comes to the remedy assessed for the violation, courts 
do not pursue the conceptual implications of their classifications. In-
stead, and regardless of the contract versus property classification of 
the offense, court are relatively consistent in pursuing a pattern under 
which the plaintiff can recover the greater of the two remedies, contract 
versus property damages. 
A. Breach of License v. Infringement of Intellectual Property 
The second example of the tense line between breach of contract 
and violation of property involves unlicensed use of intellectual proper-
ty. Judge Benjamin Cardozo explained that  
[t]he author who suffers infringement of his copy-
right at the hands of a licensee may . . . seek redress 
under the statute by action in the federal courts. But 
that is not in all circumstances the only remedy avail-
able. If the same act is not merely an invasion of the 
statutory right of property, but is also the breach of a 
contract . . . he may count upon the breach or the 
abuse, and have relief accordingly.11 
The unauthorized use by the licensee could be both a breach of the 
license contract and the resulting contract remedies, or an infringe-
ment of the licensor’s intellectual property and the resulting property 
law remedies. In copyright law, for example, the Copyright Act awards 
the owner the disgorgement remedy,12 which could be substantially 
higher than the normal contract damages that measure the righthold-
er’s lost profits. In patent law, the shift from contract to infringement 
  
not shield himself by showing that the property from which it was 
taken was, as a whole, worth as much as it was before.”) 
10 Laurin v. DeCarolis, 363 N.E. 2d 675. 
11 Underhill v Schenck, 143 NE 773, 775 (NY 1924). 
12 See 17 USC § 504(b) (“The copyright owner is entitled to recover . . . 
any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and 
are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.”). 
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remedies could also increase the magnitude of damages. Further, unlike 
contract recovery, infringement of intellectual property opens the door 
to recovery of treble damages and attorneys’ fees in certain cases,13 as 
well as a longer statute of limitations (Merges 2005, at 1509).  
 
American courts have struggled to draw a clear line between the 
two measures of recovery and determine which is available in any given 
case. The rules determining when the aggrieved party is entitled to the 
property remedy and when he is restricted to the contract remedy are 
technical and almost arbitrary. For example, a key doctrinal distinction is 
whether the license is exclusive or not. An exclusive license is regarded 
as a transfer of the “ownership” of the copyright rights, and the exclu-
sive licensee—as the person who now “owns” some copyright rights—
is “incapable of infringing a copyright interest that is owned by him.”14 
He is only “capable of breaching the contractual obligations imposed on 
him by the license.”15 If, instead, the license were not exclusive, the 
breaching licensee could be deemed a violator of someone else’s prop-
erty and liable for copyright infringement damages.16 
 
There are other ways courts determine whether the licensor is enti-
tled to contract versus property damages. If the licensee breaches a 
promissory obligation under the license agreement, then it is breach of 
contract and he is liable only for contract damages. If, on the other hand, 
the licensee fails to satisfy a condition precedent, then the license is 
deemed not to exist, and, in the absence of a license, the violator is liable 
for infringement remedies.17 Or, if the licensor is entitled to cancel the 
contract in response to the breach, he may do so and with the license 
no longer in place, the only remaining ground for recovery is IP in-
fringement (that is, property damages). In fact, the same violation can 
give rise to damages both for breach (prior to the license termination) 
                                                                                                                                             
13 See 35 USC §§ 283–85 (patent); 15 USC § 1117 (trademark); 17 USC 
§§ 502–05 (copyright). 
14 Id at 695, quoting Cortner v Israel, 732 F2d 267, 271 (2d Cir 1984). 
15 Charter Communications, 936 F2d at 695. 
16 See Sun Microsystems v Microsoft Corp, 188 F3d 1115, 1121 (9th 
Cir 1999) (noting that generally a “‘copyright owner who grants a 
nonexclusive license to use his copyrighted material waives his right 
to sue the licensee for copyright infringement’ and can sue only for 
breach of contract”). 
17 See, for example, Graham v James, 144 F3d 229, 236–37 (2d Cir 
1998); Richards (2002, at 51-52). 
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and for infringement (for the period following termination).18 This ac-
cess to property damages becomes all the more secure if the license 
itself contains a reversion clause that automatically terminates the li-
censee’s rights (Richards, 2002).  
 
Finally, jurisdiction rules can affect the remedy. Federal courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over copyright infringement actions, where-
as state courts adjudicate contract disputes. When a complaint asserts 
breach of license and infringement of copyright—does it arise under 
copyright law or under contract law? Does it go to Federal or state 
court?19 Many courts hold that the complaint arises under the Copy-
right Act if it is for a remedy granted by the Act—a “well-pleaded com-
plaint rule” that gives the plaintiff the outright choice.20 This choice is 
constrained by a variety of tests: whether the dispute is “informed by 
the substantive law of copyright,”21 or whether it is within the “subject 
matter of copyright.”22  
 
As we see, this classification is difficult to resolve. The law entitles 
the right holder to two types of remedies but does not draw a clear and 
reasoned boundary between the causes of action. This means that in 
many cases the owner would be effectively able to choose which reme-
dy to claim and could wait to plead the count that provides the higher 
recovery.23  
 
C. Breach of Fiduciary Contract 
 
A third example of the tense line between breach of contract and 
violation of property involves the remedies for violations of fiduciary 
                                                                                                                                             
 18 See, for example, Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation v General 
Electric Co, 880 F Supp 1266, 1274–76 (ED Wis 1995). 
 19 McCarthy (1993).  
 20 See T.B. Harms Co v Eliscu, 339 F2d 823, 828 (2d Cir 1964). See 
also Bassett v Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F3d 343, 355 (2d Cir 
2000). 
 21 SAPC, Inc v Lotus Development Corp, 699 F Supp 1009, 1012 (D 
Mass 1988). 
 22 La Resolana Architects, PA v Clay Realtors Angel Fire, 416 F3d 
1195, 1199 n 2 (10th Cir 2005). 
 23 Courts even permit plaintiffs to amend their complaints and shift 
the basis of recovery. See, for example, Matarese v Moore-McCormack 
Lines, Inc, 158 F2d 631, 633 (2d Cir 1946); Frontier Management Co v 
Balboa Insurance Co, 658 F Supp 987, 994 (D Mass 1986). 
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obligations by an agent. An agent who violates his duties to the princi-
pal (for example, by expropriating an amount of money entrusted to 
him in the first place) is committing a breach of contract and can be 
charged with damages equal to the value of the funds, had they re-
mained in principal’s account. This is the standard measure of expecta-
tion damages. But if the agent receives a benefit through the violation 
of the duty of loyalty (say, if the agent expropriates funds and invests 
them in his own account successfully), the principal is entitled to re-
cover the entire benefit obtained as result of the violation.24 
 
For example, in Kelley v Allin, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
held that a plaintiff had the right to choose between the value of prop-
erty entrusted to the fiduciary or the profit made by his wrongful act: 
“It was for the plaintiff to elect whether to bring suit to compel a con-
veyance of the property which the defendant acquired as the result of 
his dealings . . . or to hold him accountable for the gain which he made 
[from the wrongful transaction].”25 
 
In this area of the law, there is no conceptual confusion regarding 
the availability of the property-based remedy of disgorgement. As ex-
plained by a New York court, “all profits and every advantage beyond 
lawful compensation made by an agent in the business, or by dealing or 
speculating with the effects of his principal, though in violation of his 
duty of agent, and though the loss, if one had occurred, would have fall-
en on the agent, are for the benefit of the principal.”26 The normative 
case in favor of the stiffer property damages is also clear: “It is only by a 
rigid adherence to this simple rule that all temptation can be removed 
from one acting in a fiduciary capacity to abuse his trust, or seek his 
own advantage in the position which it affords him.”27  
 
Nevertheless, the contract/property dichotomy reappears if the 
disgorgement damages are low (or negative). Imagine a fiduciary who 
expropriates funds from the client’s account and invests them under his 
own account (or gambles with the money in a casino). If the fiduciary 
earns a profit from this violation, it is duly disgorged. But if the fiduci-
ary loses the investment, the client can turn instead to contract damag-
                                                                                                                                             
24 Restatement (Second) of Agency §407 
25
 212 Mass 327, 333 (Mass 1912). 
26
 Dutton v Willner, 52 NY 312, 319 (NT 1873). 
27
 Id. 
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es and recover the value that the funds, had the fiduciary performed his 
obligations under the contract. The “principal [can] elect to get back the 
thing improperly dealt with or to recover from the agent its value or the 
amount of benefit which the agent has improperly received.”28 
 
Some state statutes have endorsed similar positions.  For example, 
a Colorado state statute involving trade secrets mandates that “Damag-
es [for misappropriation of trade secrets] may include both the actual 
loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by 
misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual 
loss.29  
III. EX POST VERSUS EX ANTE MEASURES OF DAMAGES 
The previous section identified a particular dichotomy in the law 
of remedies – the interface between property and contract damages. In 
this part, I discuss a second, unrelated, dichotomy – the interface be-
tween ex post and ex ante damages. Once this second dichotomy is 
drawn out, the remainder of the article will discuss the combined effect 
of the two. 
 
An ex post measures of damages is a rule that sets the magnitude 
of recovery according to the actual realization of the protected interest. 
If, say, the remedy is expectation damages, the ex post measure means 
the actual lost profit suffered by the right holder, as assessed by court 
based on all the information available after the fact (hence the term “ex 
post”). Or, if the remedy is the disgorgement of benefit, the ex post 
measure means the actual benefit reaped by the wrongdoer.  
 
Ex post measures serve the objective of “accuracy.” If the purpose 
of a particular liability rule is to make a party “whole” based on some 
conception of redress, then the ex post measure applies this redress in 
a way that corresponds to the actual realization. A party who was in-
jured more recovers more.  
 
The law of remedies is replete with ex post measures of damages. 
Tort law, usually, seeks to compensate the victim for the actual harm 
suffered, as proven in court based on all the available evidence. Con-
                                                                                                                                             
28
 Tarnowski v Resop, 236 Minn 33, 38 (Minn 1954). 
29
 Col Rev Stat § 7-74-104(1). 
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tract law, often, seeks to award the aggrieved promise the actual lost 
profit, or the consequential loss. Parties with different magnitudes of 
loss receive different damages. Patent law, likewise, grants the patentee 
whose patent was infringed a lost profit measure of damages that, at 
times, can be highly idiosyncratic.  
 
An ex ante measure of damages, in contrast, is a rule that sets the 
magnitude of the recovery according the information known prior to 
the violation, before the actual realization of the loss or the benefit. It is 
an expected value—a hypothetical quantum—equal to the average of 
the possible ex post realizations. If, for example, the remedy is expecta-
tion damages, the ex ante measure is the average anticipated lost profit. 
In a breach of license case, it could be equal to hypothetical royalties 
that the owner would have negotiated in a hypothetical license, had the 
infringer approached him and sought to secure a license.30 This hypo-
thetical royalty measure is merely an educated guess—a mid-range 
point. It reflects the expected value of the right to the parties and their 
relative bargaining power, based on information that was available pre-
infringement.31  
 
The law is replete with ex ante measures of damages. In some are-
as of tort law, plaintiffs cannot recover their actual loss but instead are 
compensated according to tables and charts that are uniform across all 
victims. For example, workers compensation in the United States, or 
Social Security disability insurance, follow charts that apply fixed dam-
ages, irrespective of actual harm. Even in contract law, an aggrieved 
buyer can recover damages equal to the difference between the con-
tract price and the market price at the time of breach, which is an aver-
age way to measure the actual loss.  
                                                                                                                                             
 30 35 USC § 284 (allowing the award of “damages adequate to com-
pensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable 
royalty”). See, for example, Panduit Corp v Stahlin Bros Fibre Works, 575 
F2d 1152, 1157 (6th Cir 1978) (“When actual damages, e.g., lost profits, 
cannot be proved, the patent owner is entitled to a reasonable royal-
ty.”); Georgia-Pacific Corp v United States Plywood Corp, 318 F Supp 
1116, 1120 (SDNY 1970) (listing the factors relevant to the calculation 
of a reasonable royalty). 
 31 See Lucent Technology v Gateway, 580 F3d 1301, 1325, 1332 (Fed 
Cir 2009) (“The hypothetical negotiation tries, as best as possible, to 
recreate the ex ante licensing negotiation scenario and to describe the 
resulting agreement . . . to elucidate how the parties would have valued 
the patented feature.”). 
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In some areas of the law, plaintiffs can choose among the ex post 
and ex ante measures.  In patent law, for example, the patentee can 
choose between lost profit (ex post measure) and hypothetical royalty 
(ex ante measure). In copyright law, the copyright holder can choose 
between disgorgement of benefit (ex post measure) and statutory 
damages (ex ante measure). In contract law, the aggrieved buyer can 
choose between actual lost profits (ex post measure) and con-
tract/market differential damages (ex ante damages). Or, if a service 
provider is suing the client for breach of contract after partial perfor-
mance was already done, he is entitled to restitution damages meas-
ured by the actual benefit conferred to the breaching party (ex post 
damages) or by the hypothetical fee that would be charged for such 
partial performance (ex ante measure). In property law, a co-tenant or 
co-owner who invests in updating the common property can recover 
the value of the improvement (ex post measure) or the cost he incurred 
(ex ante measure). The former is available under the “improvement” 
doctrine while the latter is available under the “repairs” doctrine, but 
since many types of updates could be classified as either improvement 
or repair, the law effectively grants the investing party a choice. 
 
IV. THE DISTORTIVE EFFECT OF THE REMEDIAL OPTIONS 
  
What’s wrong with a fuzzy boundary between contract and prop-
erty damages? What’s wrong with an option to choose the greater of 
the ex post and ex ante measures of damages? The analysis above 
shows the difficulty of drawing a clear boundary between various rem-
edies and thus the ways different causes of action, and different ways to 
measure them, overlap. This gives rise to a complex and sometimes 
messy body of doctrine, which tries (sometimes arbitrarily) to distin-
guish the grounds for various remedies. But my critique here will focus 
on a different problematic aspect of the fuzzy boundary. When causes 
of actions overlap, parties have the option to choose the remedy that is 
more favorable. It is this option, I will argue, that can create distortions 
in compensation and in the incentives of the parties.  
 
Return, now, to the example discussed in the introduction. It con-
sidered a violation that could both harm the owner and benefit the vio-
lator. It further assumed that the magnitude of either effect is unknown 
at the time of violation, but becomes known by the time of trial.  
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Case I: No benefit. Assume, first, that the violation creates no bene-
fit to the violator, but creates an expected harm (lost profit) of $1000. 
After the fact, harm could be either high or low – either $1500 or $500 
with equal probabilities, and so on average it is equal $1000. Under a 
pure ex post rule of expectation damages, the aggrieved party can re-
cover either $1500 or $500, depending on the actual loss. Under a pure 
ex ante rule of expectation damages, the aggrieved party can recover 
exactly $1000, regardless of whether the true harm is either $1500 or 
$500. But what if the plaintiff can choose between the ex-post and ex-
ante measures of damages? What if, say, an aggrieved patent holder can 
recover either the hypothetical royalty (the ex ante measure) of $1000, 
or his actual lost profit, and can choose the greater of the two? In such 
case, the plaintiff would choose the ex ante measure of $1000 when the 
actual lost profit is lower (equal to $500), but would choose to recover 
the ex post measure of actual lost profit when it is higher (equal to 
$1500). The expected recovery is the average of $1000 and $1500, 
which equals $1250. It is greater than the expected loss. 
 
Case II: No Harm. Assume, now, that the violation creates no harm 
to the owner, but creates an expected benefit to the violator, of $1000. 
After the fact, the benefit could be either high or low – either $2000 or 
$0 with equal probabilities, and so on average it equals $1000. Under a 
pure ex post rule of disgorgement damages, the aggrieved party can 
recover either $2000 or $0, depending on the actual benefit. Under a 
pure ex ante rule, the aggrieved party can recover exactly $1000, re-
gardless of whether the actual benefit is $2000 or $0. But what if the 
plaintiff can choose between the ex post and ex ante measures of dis-
gorgement damages? What if, say, a copyright owner can disgorge the 
infringer’s actual profit, or—if this measure turns out to be too low (if 
the infringer made no profit)—he can recover instead the statutory 
damages under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act?32 If the benefit turns out 
to be high, the aggrieved plaintiff would choose the ex post measure 
and recover $2000. And if the benefit turns out to be low, the aggrieved 
plaintiff would forgo the ex post measure and recover instead the ex 
ante measure, equal to the average benefit of $1000. The expected re-
covery is the average of $1000 and $2000, which equals $1500. It is 
greater than the expected benefit. 
                                                                                                                                             
 32 17 USC § 504(c)(1) (“[T]he copyright owner may elect . . . to re-
cover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory 
damages . . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the 
court considers just.”). 
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Case III: Fixed Benefit and Harm. Assume, next, that the violation 
creates both a benefit and harm. As before, the harm will be either 
$1500 or $500, and the benefit either $2000 or $0, all with equal 
chances. It is also assumed that the high/low realization of harm is in-
dependent of the high/low realization of the benefit.  
 
Notice that the expected values of the harm and of the benefit are 
$1000, which means that, from an ex ante perspective, the violation is 
welfare-neutral. It is neither efficient nor inefficient. This is a special 
case, but it is useful to consider it because it can help us see the pres-
ence of a distortion in the measurement of damages that is independ-
ent of any additional normative concern related to the effect of the vio-
lation on total welfare. 
 
What will the plaintiff choose, if he had the option between con-
tract and property damages, and in addition had the option between ex 
post and ex ante damages? There is a 50% chance that the ex post ben-
efit is $2000, in which case the aggrieved plaintiff will choose the ex-
post disgorgement measure of $2000, regardless of how high the lost 
profit is (which cannot exceed $1500). But there is also a 50% chance 
that the ex post benefit is low, $0, in which case the plaintiff would have 
the option to turn to the lost profit measure. If that measure turns out, 
ex post, to be high ($1500), the plaintiff will choose to recover the ex 
post expectation damage measure. But if the lost profit also turned out 
to be low, $500, the plaintiff will abandon any ex post recovery measure 
and seek instead the ex ante measure (of either benefit or lost profits, 
which are here assumed to be equal), of $1000.  
 
The following table summarizes the plaintiff ’s choice: 
 
Case Benefit Lost profit Combined 
probability 
Plaintiff ’s 
choice 
HH $2000 $1500 25% $2000 
HL $2000 $500 25% $2000 
LH $0 $1500 25% $1500 
LL $0 $500 25% $1000 
(Case “HL” means High benefit and Low lost profit; and so on.) 
 
Notice that there is a 75% chance that the plaintiff will choose the 
ex post measure (50% chance of ex-post disgorgement measure and 
25% ex post lost profit measure.) There is only a 25% chance that the 
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plaintiff will choose an ex ante measure, because the ex ante measure is 
preferable only when both the benefit and the lost profit are low (case 
LL). 
 
The table also helps us calculate the expected recovery for the ag-
grieved plaintiff, which equals $1625.33 It is higher than the expected 
damages under either case I ($1250) or case II ($1500). 
 
In cases I and II, the excess recovery beyond the expected loss or 
benefit was due to the option to choose the greater of the ex post or the 
ex ante measures of the particular remedy. In case III, the excess recov-
ery is due to two confounding options: the option to choose the greater 
of the contract or property damages, and the option to choose the 
greater of their respective ex post and ex ante values.  
 
The effect of a “greater of” regime is distortive because the portfo-
lio of damages it creates ends up depending on arbitrary, irrelevant 
factors. That is, violations that create the same expected harm or the 
same expected benefits at the time they are committed end up with 
different expected recoveries. To see why, look again at case I – where 
the violation causes a stochastic lost profit, but no benefit. In the origi-
nal example, the lost profit was either $1500 or $500. Let’s call this 
case I.A, and compare it to case I.B, which has the same feature of no-
benefit, and the same expected lost profit of $1000, but a different dis-
tribution: instead of {$1500, $500}, assume that the lost profits are 
{$1100, $900}. Namely, the High loss is not as high (only $1100, instead 
of $1500), but the Low loss is also not as low ($900, instead of $500). 
The plaintiff will continue to choose the ex post measure of damages 
when the lost profits are high, and the ex ante measure of damage when 
the lost profits are low, but now the expected value of this recovery 
portfolios is only $1050, lower than it was in case I.A ($1250). 
 
What’s going on? What is the pattern that explains these results? 
The choice of remedy regime entitles the owner to recover the actual 
realized value bundled with a put option to sell this right to the violator 
for the ex ante value of $1,000. The excess recovery under this regime 
equals the value of the put option. The more volatile the ex post value 
of the asset—case I.A is more volatile than case I.B because the vari-
ance of {$1500, $500} is greater than the variance of {$1100, $900}—
                                                                                                                                             
33  ¼×2000 + ¼×2000 + ¼×1500 + ¼×1000 = 1625. 
 17 
the more valuable the put option and the larger the excess recovery 
enjoyed by the plaintiff. The expected recovery depends not only on the 
expected value of the measure, but also its volatility. 
 
Thus, in case II, the recovery exceeded that of Case I (either I.A or 
I.B) because the volatility of the benefit was greater than the volatility 
of the lost profit. And in case III the recovery was the highest because 
the expected value of $1000 was bolstered by two, rather then one, op-
tions—the option to choose benefit based versus lost-profit based re-
covery, and the option to choose ex post versus ex ante measures of 
each remedy. 
 
These embedded options to choose the more favorable damage 
measure—contract versus property, and ex-post versus ex-ante—
increase the recovery beyond the amount that is needed to protect the 
violated interest. It is possible that this increased recovery is useful to 
overcome what might otherwise be sub-optimal damages. For example, 
if for some reason the aggrieved party does not enforce his rights in 
every case of violation, a “multiplier” is necessary to offset the lower 
enforcement effort and maintain optimal deterrence. But this “imper-
fect enforcement” rationale does not seem to explain the patterns of the 
law. The option to choose contract versus property damages arises 
when there is a contract. In a non-contractual setting, when one’s prop-
erty is violated, the only damages are the property measure. Is there 
any reason to expect that the presence of a contract would serve to re-
duce the probability of enforcement and thus justify a damages multi-
plier relative to the non-contractual case? If at all, it would seem that 
the presence of contract makes the identity of the violator known and 
the likelihood of enforcement higher, reducing the need for any multi-
plier. And so the option to choose creates a multiplier where it is least 
needed. 
 
Moreover, an option to choose the greater of two remedies is a 
poor way to set a damages multiplier. If the reason to multiply damages 
is the low probability of detection, this—and not the value of the op-
tion—should be the multiplying criterion. Why should violations that 
create a higher variance of effects (where, we saw, the option value is 
higher) be punished more severely? If anything, the more profitable the 
violation is to the violator, the more likely it is to lead to enforcement. 
When the owner sees that the violator profited well from the violation, 
the owner is more likely to sue and seek a disgorgement remedy. Thus, 
violations that create high variance of benefits (small chance of very 
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high profits) may be more likely to end up with a disgorgement suit. 
And with the higher likelihood of suit, there is less need for a damage 
multiplier. The choice of remedy scheme is worth more in cases of high 
detection probability—contrary to the deterrence rationale. And so, 
again, the option to choose creates a larger multiplier where a smaller 
one is needed, and vice versa. 
V. IMPAIRED LIABILITY RULES 
There is perhaps a good explanation for the pattern of remedy op-
tions that private law accords the aggrieved owner. As we saw, these 
options create a regime of super-compensatory damages. But there is a 
way that the violator can avoid the burden of such overcompensation: 
he can negotiate the right to commit the unauthorized use. To avoid the 
harsh “greater-of” sanction, a potential violator would contract for the 
right—would negotiate and secure a paid-for license. When the costs of 
negotiating a license are lower than the cost of dispute resolution, such 
incentive is desirable. 
 
For example, the seller who wants to strip the land from trees and 
gravel after selling it to the buyer may negotiate for this right rather 
than unilaterally haul away the goods. Or, a copyright licensee who 
wants to engage in additional, non-authorized uses would renegotiate 
the original license to expand the permitted uses.  Or, a client who 
wishes to terminate a service contract prematurely can negotiate com-
pensation for the disappointed service provider, rather than unilateral-
ly breach pay restitution damages. In these settings, and in numerous 
others, the law correctly channels parties to engage in transactions, 
rather than act unilaterally. Call options on other people’s property are 
fairly rare. 
 
Of course, there are situations in which diverting parties to a con-
sensual negotiation would be undesirable, because such negotiations 
are too costly and difficult to conduct. This question—when is a volun-
tary transaction superior to a unilateral compensated violation—is an 
ages-old fundamental inquiry. It is the familiar “property rules versus 
liability rules” dichotomy. This is a normative dilemma that may be set-
tled by reference to transactions costs, or to defensive costs, or to no-
tions of liberty and autonomy, or according to a framework distributive 
justice. Nothing in the analysis of this paper implicates such normative 
inquiry or contributes to the body of thinking about the proper division 
of labor among property rules and liability rules.  
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What the analysis did demonstrate, however, is the inadvertent 
impairment of liability rules. Imagine that, for any given set of reasons, 
it is determined that the optimal way to protect an entitlement is by a 
liability rule. Perhaps because transactions costs or coordination costs 
are too high; or because some owners are too wealthy and stubborn 
and are unwilling to sell usage rights at reasonable prices; or because 
some people have dire and urgent needs that would be undermined if 
channeled to market transactions. A liability rule is thus set in place 
and a “price” for the violation is tagged, so that one-sided violations 
may occur in the desired set of circumstances. Unfortunately, the effect 
of the options described in this article is to distort the “price.” The vio-
lator would have to pay, not the price the law intended to set, but a 
higher price that reflects the option that the owner has to choose 
among the various legal ways to measure this “price.” The law perhaps 
intended to grant the owner a compensation based on one of several 
ways to measure his loss. But the law did not mean to bolster the com-
pensation in an arbitrary way that reflects something different than the 
loss (or gain), but rather reflects only the option value—that is, the var-
iance of the distribution of harms. 
 
The inadvertent increase in expected compensation could be be-
nign, if the violator would continue to behave in the same way even 
under in the presence of costlier remedies. There would be a redistrib-
utive effect, but not necessarily a chilling incentive effect. This is the 
same redistributive effect that property rules accomplish – they let 
owners extract more of the surplus from violators. But the inadvertent 
increase in expected compensation could also increase deterrence. 
Some violations would not occur and some violators would have to go 
through the more expensive routes of negotiated transfers. If a liability 
rule were deemed desirable, the unintended effect of the remedial di-
chotomies is to transform it into a property rule. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article identified two options that owners have in seeking rem-
edies. The first is the choice between contract and property damages. 
This dichotomy arises in situation in which the owner and the violator 
have a contractual relationship, and the violator overstepped his rights in 
a way that is more severe than mere contract breach. The second option 
is the choice between accurate ex post damages based on the realization 
of the infringed value and average ex ante damages based on some 
measure that is independent of the actual realization. Both options arise 
 20 
from the unclear boundaries between remedial rules. The con-
tract/property fuzzy boundary is due to the difficulty of distinguishing 
breach and infringement. The ex post versus ex ante fuzzy boundary is 
due to the portfolio of remedies that are available to aggrieved parties. 
 
These options arise without courts ever noticing them. For the 
same violation, a party may bring a claim for property remedy, or for ex 
post measure of damages, only because some realization of harm or 
benefit turned out, by chance, to be high. A court adjudicating this claim 
is not positioned to recognize the ex ante distribution of harms or 
benefits, and to recognize that an implicit exercise of remedial option 
occurred. As far as I know, courts have never noticed the over-
compensation effect that is due to the embedded options.  
 
As long as the law is wedded to an approach of a menu of reme-
dies, such results are probably inevitable. The way to overcome this 
distortion is to thin down the menu of remedial choices. For example, if 
remedies were always based on ex ante measures, then the option to 
choose the greater of the ex post and ex ante damages would be elimi-
nated. But for this solution to arise, the law has to abandon the strong 
held notions of the importance of “accuracy” in the assessment of dam-
ages. 
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